Authentication Security Protocols
Research — formal, lightweight authentication and attestation protocols for cyber-physical and networked systems.
Research · Cryptographic protocols · Formal methods
Authentication protocols you can prove — and deploy
A research line on authentication and attestation protocols: mutual auth, peer-to-peer auth-attestation, secret-sharing resilience, and scalable topologies — with formal security analysis and mathematical argumentation, not only empirics.
Mutual authCore primitive
AttestationAuth + integrity
FormalSecurity proofs
ScalableTopology design
System Protocol family spanning mutual authentication, combined authentication-attestation (including P2P UAV/network settings), Shamir-style secret sharing for reliability, and topology designs for time-optimal authentication of large fleets.
Problem Ad-hoc “secure channel” recipes fail under mobility, partial compromise, and noisy hardware roots. Without formal analysis, protocols look fine until an adversary model is stated precisely.
Our contribution Specified adversary models and protocol flows; proved security properties for lightweight constructions; designed attestation-aware variants; published scalable authentication topologies and secret-sharing approaches for reliable UAV/network authentication.
Representative threads
| Thread | Focus |
|---|---|
| Mutual authentication | Two-party auth under constrained crypto |
| Auth + attestation | Prove identity and integrity of software/state |
| Resilience | Secret sharing / fault tolerance for noisy PUFs |
| Scale | Topologies for time-optimal multi-device authentication |
Achievements
- Multiple peer-reviewed authentication / attestation protocols
- Formal methods + practical constrained-device constraints in the same papers
- Backbone methodology reused across UAV and IoT security lines